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I INTRODUCTION 
I
t is a real honour to be here in Ireland to celebrate the founding Director of
the Institute, R.C. Geary. If I understand correctly, I am visiting on the
second anniversary of the Institute’s move into this building. It is a great
pleasure to be able to share this occasion with you as well as to participate in
a lecture series that has a long distinctive history of very interesting speakers.
This is actually my first trip to Ireland. For years, I could not wait to get to
Ireland to see and to experience this great economic boom, but I guess I should
have come a few years sooner.
The topic of my talk today is what I term the entrepreneurial society or the
emergence of the entrepreneurial society, which suggests that something has
changed. The Director and I were speaking on the way here about the fall of
the Berlin Wall which was nearly twenty years ago, in November 1989, shortly
before we first met. A lot of euphoria followed not only because Germany was
reuniting but because Europe was reuniting, and there was also the end of the
Cold War. In this euphoria people expected an economic surge to follow, freed
from the burden of supporting the Cold War military, but also the related
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01 Audretsch article_ESRI Vol 40  10/09/2009  12:59  Page 255social and political burden. However, we know the 1990s that followed were
actually pretty tough – perhaps not for those of you here in Ireland – but all
across the rest of Europe.
Since European economies did not prosper in the 1990s, it was not
surprising that at the turn of the century Europe was making efforts to try to
reignite growth and to generate employment. What was surprising, I think,
was the completely new direction Europe took at the Council of Lisbon 2000:
In the so-called Lisbon Strategy, the EU made a commitment not just to be the
leader of knowledge in the West but also the leader in entrepreneurship.
Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, said that the field
of entrepreneurship needs to be taken seriously because “…there is mounting
evidence that the key to economic growth and productivity improvements lies
in the entrepreneurial capacity of an economy”. 
That was surprising, at least to me and, I suspect to many other
economists I know. I had spent the 1970s studying economics at Bachelor’s
and Master’s degree levels, without ever hearing anything about
entrepreneurship. When public policymakers looked to ignite economic growth
and generate employment they typically turned to large corporations. Charlie
“Engine” Wilson, the Chairman of General Motors, declared “What’s good for
General Motors is good for America.” The management scholar, Alfred
Chandler provided meticulous empirical evidence confirming that economies
of scale and scope generated higher levels of efficiency and productivity in the
largest corporations. 
Joseph Schumpeter, echoed this view, “Since capitalist enterprise, by its
very achievements, tends to automise progress, we conclude that it tends to
make itself superfluous – to break to pieces under the pressure of its own
success. The perfectly bureaucratic giant industrial unit not only ousts the
small- or medium-sized firm and ‘expropriates’ its owners, but in the end it
also ousts the entrepreneur and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class which
in the process stands to lose not only in its income but also, what is infinitely
more important, its function.” 
Similarly, John Kenneth Galbraith concluded that the entrepreneur “…is
a diminishing figure…. Apart from access to capital, his principal
qualifications were imagination, capacity for decision and courage in risking
money, including, not infrequently, his own. None of these qualifications is
especially important for organising intelligence or effective in competing with
it.” As Galbraith conceded, “power” has shifted from entrepreneurs to the large
organisation, “So it is with organisation – organised competence – that the
power now lies.” 
Countries with a deficiency of large corporations focused their develop  -
ment largely on attracting inward foreign direct investment. In fact, from
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generate growth was to try to attract in more foreign direct investment.
Certainly, in developing countries it was all about attracting physical capital
first, with the expectation that growth and employment would follow. 
My lecture today is based on a research agenda that I have been pursuing
for some years. In essence the research tries to understand why policy
throughout most of the OECD countries, regions, and cities – perhaps most
strongly at regional and city levels – has been looking to entrepreneurship as
the generator of economic growth. So the purpose of this lecture and the
underlying research behind it, is to try to uncover what entrepreneurship has
to do with economic growth. To do this, I am going to explain what we call the
“Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship”, which suggests that
entrepreneurship is important because it serves as a key conduit for
knowledge spillovers. Knowledge is created in one organisation, whether a
large research corporation or laboratory. However, knowledge does not just
‘appear’ in new organisations, like manna from heaven as the Solow growth
model implied. Rather it requires individuals to take that knowledge –
removing it from the originating organisation and bringing it to another, or
new, organisation and then commercialising it. Finally, not wishing to suggest
what public policy should be, as that is probably too bold for me, I want to
interpret what public policy seems to have been doing for some time now, for
a decade at least, which is to treat entrepreneurship as a bona fide instrument
of economic growth. 
II  A PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA: EFFICIENCY VERSUS
DECENTRALISED DECISION MAKING 
An entire generation of scholars in the emerging field of Industrial
Organisation identified the driving force of efficiency and productivity at firm
and industry levels. They concluded, after developing theory and conducting
empirical research, that economies of scale are important, which, in
retrospect, is not especially surprising when you think about manufacturing
industry, where physical capital matters. What this meant for public policy
was that there seemed to be a trade-off between having the scale economics of
concentrated industry and firms, on the one hand, as against the benefits of
having decentralised decision makers on the other hand. In effect, it was seen
as a trade-off between efficiency and democratic decentralised decision
making.
What this meant for public policy was really how to live with the ‘beast of
big business’: and different countries had different responses to this policy
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ownership of industries. In Sweden, Saab was owned by the government, as
was Renault in France – to name just two governmental ownership examples.
Other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, put heavy regulation
in place to prevent private industry from abusing its market power. The
United States had actually a lot of public ownership and strong regulation. In
addition, America placed a strong reliance on antitrust policy, or what is
referred to as competition policy in Europe. 
What about entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship policy? Certainly the
public policy debate focusing on economic growth and employment creation
during the early post-World War II era, typically ignored entrepreneurship, or
the idea of helping people start businesses. When the US Small Business
Administration was established in 1952, the US Congress mandated that the
Small Business Administration should protect and preserve small business.
There was a clear sense that while small businesses were perceived as
essentially inefficient, they were desirable for social or political reasons –
keeping a kind of dispersed decision making intact but with an acknowledged
high opportunity cost, in economic terms. That was essentially the role of
entrepreneurship during the post-World War II era. But we know that
globalisation put an end to the competitiveness of places based on physical
capital. What we saw was the de-linking of the competitiveness of firms from
the competitiveness of what Germans call “der Standort”.
As shown in a study carried out for the German Ministry of Economics,
employment at the top corporations in Germany changed after the Berlin Wall
fell. At Volkswagen, total employment stayed the same, with employment
outside of Germany increasing, while employment within Germany decreased.
The company was doing fine – we know that its profits were fine. There were
fewer employees in Germany and more employees outside of Germany due to
what we now call offshoring, substituting technology for capital and
employment in Germany. This pattern replicates itself throughout the auto
sector and elsewhere. Overall, the German auto industry lost 161,000 jobs in
Germany while creating 30,000 in other countries. If you look at examples in
the chemical industry, say Hoechst, you can see that while total employment
went down a little, employment increased outside of Germany, again leading
to many fewer employees in Germany. For the whole sector, we see in the
chemical industry a loss of 80,000 jobs in Germany, with 14,000 jobs added
outside Germany. This is true for almost all of the largest German companies.
While the companies and the industries generally were doing fine, because of
globalisation German firms were creating jobs outside their national
boundaries, and consequently Germany itself saw fewer manufacturing
employees.
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followed in England, Sweden, and the US. I would not want to argue whether
this adjustment pattern was good or bad, but rather to recognise that this was
probably the inevitable impact of globalisation, and that it amounted to a very
large change. 
III  IS INVESTING IN KNOWLEDGE THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY
PANACEA? 
Fortunately, economics had an answer to help policymakers to deal with
this major change. The answer was to move away from the public policy focus
on investing in physical capital towards recognition of the role of investing in
knowledge. Paul Romer and a whole generation of scholars shifted to models
of endogenous growth to focus on investment in knowledge. They recognised
that while you can shift factories from high cost locations in Europe and North
America to Central and Eastern Europe or Asia, it is a lot harder to shift 
ideas and idea creation. Face-to-face communication is critical for ideas and
idea creation and you cannot just outsource that kind of creative process. 
So in what was known as the ‘endogenous growth model’ or the ‘new
growth model’, knowledge became the focus and it framed the policy debate. In
this policy context about five or six years ago, I was invited to visit Stockholm.
Sweden, like Germany and much of Europe but not Ireland had suffered from
stagnant growth in the 1990s, with unemployment steadily increasing. So I
was asked to discuss what should Sweden do in this context. As a kind of a
born again growth theorist, I marched into Stockholm and I told the host, the
Swedish Minister of Economics, exactly what Sweden should do: It needed to
invest in knowledge, it needed to invest in R&D, it needed to invest in
universities and invest in human capital, education, and so on. I remember
our host very kindly assuring the audience that while the Professor must be
correct, nobody will ever believe him because by all the measurements,
Sweden was either number one or two in the world in terms of patents, in
terms of R&D per capita, and in terms of university education. Further, the
Pisa Studies on Pre-University Education showed Sweden to be way up at the
top. So it is hard to know what Sweden should really be doing differently. It
was there I first heard the phrase ‘Swedish Paradox’, which states that if
investing in knowledge is so important, like the economists say it is, why is
growth and employment creation so elusive in Sweden.
In Brussels, Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission,
noting that the problem was not just Swedish, but pan-European, renamed it
the “European Paradox”. Certainly, in Northern and Western Europe, if you
start to think about knowledge, not in the narrow technical sense focused on
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think the European investment in knowledge is incredibly impressive.
However, despite these kinds of investments in knowledge, growth for most of
Europe, if not all of Europe, has remained elusive. 
IV  THE KNOWLEDGE FILTER
Well, had European leaders looked across to the other side of the Atlantic,
they would have discovered that they did not have a monopoly on this paradox.
A Senator from Indiana, Birch Bayh observed way back in 1978, that, as he
said, “…a wealth of scientific talented American colleges and universities –
talent responsible for the development of numerous innovative scientific
breakthroughs each year is going to waste its results on bureaucratic red tape
and illogical government regulations. What sense does it make to spend
billions of dollars each year on government supported research and then
prevent new developments from benefiting the American people because of
dumb bureaucratic red tape?” 
I am sure nobody is in favour of dumb bureaucratic red tape, but what
Senator Bayh observed is what we ultimately came to call the ‘knowledge
filter’. It says, just because there is investment in what we call knowledge…
in this case what Bayh is talking about is university knowledge … it does not
mean it will automatically spill over, thus igniting growth, innovation and
jobs. Rather when there is a knowledge filter, we find that spillovers do not
happen automatically.
Of course, in this case Senator Bayh was talking about the knowledge
filter imposed by bureaucratic red tape, in the form of government regulations.
As a result, he, and fellow Senator Bob Dole, convinced his colleagues in
Congress to pass the Bayh-Dole Act, which I would interpret as a policy to try
to reduce this knowledge filter. But really my point is that the world of
knowledge and ideas is different from the world of physical capital. With
physical capital, you know exactly what you have, but you are never really
sure how good an idea is, what it can be used for, if it is really valuable or not.
Knowledge has got this kind of uncertainty that will not just automatically
spill over for commercialisation. We see this knowledge filter not just from
knowledge generated in universities, as Senator Bayh was talking about, but
we also see it in knowledge generated in the private sector from private
companies. 
Let me illustrate this by considering the case of three young men working
for IBM some years ago in Germany. Arising from the project they had been
working on, they developed some new business software. They thought that
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to their boss, they went to their boss’s boss and said “let us start producing this
business software”. Their boss’s boss said – “you know we do not think this is
a real good idea, we do not think it is worth very much, we do not know who
is going to want this software and in any case we do not make business
software, we make computers.” So they hit a knowledge filter. However, they
were so passionate about their idea and thought it was valuable so they
thought maybe we will start our own business. They went to the three top
banks in Germany. The banks liked it and said this was a good idea. But they
thought that if the idea was really marketable, IBM would be doing it, and so
they were not willing to finance it. In the end one of them had a family
connection to a regional bank, near Heidelberg, and they got seed finance to
start what became known as SAP. And the rest is history. The point being that
I think any time you hear of a knowledge context where the asset is not
physical but rather intangible, like ideas, example after example after
example of what one person thinks is a good idea, another person might not.
Therefore, you get this knowledge filter not just in the public or university
sectors, but also in the private sector. 
Another famous example, also involving IBM, was when a young Bill
Gates tried to sell Microsoft in the mid-1980s to IBM. It triggered the famous
memo from an IBM Vice President: neither Gates nor any of his thirty
employees have the qualifications to work for IBM; so IBM did not buy
Microsoft. It was on the market for something like 30 million dollars, not a lot
of money even then, and given what has happened since, it sounds funny
today. But I would say that this kind of filter really is inevitable from the
valuation of knowledge, as it is the result of ideas being uncertain, asymmetric
– what one person thinks is a good idea, another does not. You could say that
it is high cost transaction. What does that mean? Well in the SAP story for the
boss’s boss to understand why those three men thought that the software was
a good idea, he would have literally had to be in their shoes. He would have
had to understand what they were working on, whom they knew, what their
social contact was and so on, and thus why they understood the world very
differently. You can go to your boss and say ‘here is a good idea’. I do not know
about your boss, but my boss does not always agree with me. 
V ENDOGENOUS  ENTREPRENEURSHIP
So this is what leads to what we now call endogenous entrepreneurship,
which refers to people endogenously creating a new firm to pursue and
implement their ideas, dreams, and passions when they are unable to in the
context of an existing firm. The traditional framework for thinking about firm
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help the firm become more innovative?” By contrast, endogenous
entrepreneurship flips this around and starts with ideas embedded in people,
and then asks: “What can be done to help individuals be more innovative?” In
some cases, the answer is to start new firms. This shifts the policy focus from
existing firms to a much broader set of individuals, institutions and society.
This is a way to overcome the knowledge filter that keeps them from
implementing their ideas. 
In these cases the individuals with new ideas realise that the only way
they can actually pursue those ideas is to start a new company. This is an
endogenous response to knowledge that was created in an organisational
context, be it a company or university. Without starting the new firm, the
knowledge would not be completely or exhaustively commercialised. A number
of people have trouble with this idea: why would a company create something
valuable and then just walk away from it, saying it is not valuable? Of course,
the reason for this lies in the nature of ideas – it is hard to tell which idea is
valuable and which is not. Entrepreneurship has become interesting to
policymakers because of the massive investment that society is making in
knowledge in terms of human capital, in terms of research and in terms of
cultural investment, as evidenced in the example of Sweden above and in
Romano Prodi’s statement. All of this investment creates people who are
knowledgeable, thoughtful, creative, tolerant, well travelled, experienced. In
effect, society has generated populations who receive the endowments that can
generate ideas or can recognise ideas. When they are not able to act on these
ideas in the organisational context, the entrepreneur serves as a conduit for
taking these ideas out of the organisation where they are created. Sometimes
the ideas will not work out, sometimes they will, and when they do, they
generate innovation, growth and employment. 
So what the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship suggests is
that, as we go from a context where there are not a lot of ideas or knowledge
to a context where there are more ideas and knowledge, we would expect to see
more entrepreneurship. The barriers to entrepreneurship, as Senator Bayh
noted, are sometimes legal barriers; for example, in the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe there were legal barriers prohibiting people from starting
companies. People might have seen an opportunity to promote a new idea but
legally they could not pursue it. The distinguishing point about this
Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship, is that it is a theory of
people rather than companies, taking action in the promotion of an idea. I
think traditionally when scholars and policymakers have thought about
entrepreneurship they thought about it in terms of the personal
characteristics of the entrepreneur. There is a whole body of research that says
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is their need for control, maybe it is their willingness to incur risk, something
about their propensity and taste. In effect there is something about
entrepreneurs that makes them different from, I will not say you and me but
from me. 
I mean I would not want to disagree with that research but I would say
that the endogenous entrepreneurship model gives a different view. In this
new model, it is not the people that are different, but rather the changed
context where we have a society and an economy where ideas matter more
than they did in the past – they are the driving force of economic activity – and
in order for people to take advantage of those ideas, they have to become
entrepreneurs. 
This suggests that in order to get more innovation we do not just start with
the firms that exist but rather start with society, people, and then ask how can
these people be facilitated and enabled to pursue ideas and start companies
that are going to generate growth. That is when entrepreneurship is
endogenous. 
I think the reason why policy is focusing so much more today on
entrepreneurship is because of the localisation inherent in knowledge
spillover entrepreneurship. One of the findings that has been shown
statistically/econometrically is that knowledge spillovers are geographically
concentrated. In other words, when there is investment in knowledge, R&D,
science, human capital and so on, commercialisation tends to take place within
the close geographic proximity to the knowledge sources. Knowledge spills
over into entrepreneurship, which shows that when people have access to
ideas, they are likely to start companies close to the source of those ideas. So
for policymakers this is reassuring in a global economy when
entrepreneurship polices are going to generate innovative activity close to
home and not some other part of the globe. I think one of the complications for
policymakers dealing with their own multinational corporations is these
corporations are always looking for opportunities but some of those
opportunities involve changing location and consequently the benefits may not
accrue to the policymakers. 
Studies comparing high-growth regions to low-growth regions have
discovered what differentiates them. High-growth regions have high
investments in knowledge compared with low-growth regions. High-growth
regions have a low knowledge filter, so that knowledge is able to spillover.
Low-growth regions have a high knowledge filter. How can we tell that? It is
difficult, but if we look at places where we see high investments in science,
research, etc., without a lot of commercialisation (e.g. patents) or other
benefits accruing from those investments, then we can concur that there is a
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entrepreneurship capital, that is, the capacity to generate entrepreneurs.
Low-growth regions have a low level of entrepreneurship capital. Why is that?
Well it is because entrepreneurship as I have said can serve as a conduit of
growth. There have been several studies trying to link measures of
entrepreneurship, either at a regional level, a city level or even at a national
level, to different types of measures of growth. Typically, these studies find a
positive relationship. For example, in a study we did in Germany from the
1990s, we measured start-ups in something like 93 regions of Germany. When
we linked that measurement to levels of growth in Germany we found a
positive relationship. As I said, this relationship has been found for a number
of OECD countries and regions within OECD countries. So there is a
statistical relationship, showing that places that do well in terms of growth
tend to have high levels of entrepreneurship. 
VI ENTREPRENEURSHIP  AS  CREATIVE CONSTRUCTION
Let me suggest that a Schumpeterian interpretation of the present
situation is wrong. Everybody knows that Schumpeter observed that
entrepreneurship triggered a process of creative destruction, so that the new
entrepreneur drives the old incumbents out of the market with innovative
activity. The reason why Schumpeter’s analysis is not relevant nowadays is
that if you think back to Schumpeter’s works, he is always talking about one
economy. He did not have the kind of global economy and the global
competition that we have today. So where you see entrepreneurship in a single
economy, it is going to displace the incumbents in that economy. If you think
of that data that I mentioned earlier of employment change in Germany after
the Berlin Wall fall, employment in the top German companies has declined in
Germany and has increased outside of Germany. I do not think anybody is
going to convince me that it is due to entrepreneurship in Germany. It is not
because people in Germany are starting new auto companies and thereby
driving out the employment in Volkswagen and so on. We know that this is
happening because of globalisation, with employment being shifted due to
outsourcing and offshoring, to some degree by the companies themselves to
other places. 
The concern of policymakers is with employment in most places in Europe
and North America, as I think we are an ‘employment-policy driven society’.
Therefore, we are concerned about jobs and employment. The displacement of
jobs is not the result of entrepreneurship, at least not entrepreneurship within
Germany or Europe, but is due to globalisation. That destruction is going to
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industry, or machine tools. That reduction of employment is not due to
entrepreneurship in Germany, although you could interpret it as being due to
entrepreneurship maybe in China or Asia. I would not want to argue with that
interpretation, but the point in terms of a policy perspective, is that the
destruction of these jobs is coming from globalisation. 
I think that policymakers at the European level, such as Romano Prodi, as
well as many national and regional policymakers now take that kind of
globalisation and displacement of employment or destruction as part of the
global order. They then ask: well how can we take our resources and get the
most out of them? They see this coming from the major investments being
made in knowledge, universities, education, human capital, culture and so on,
and they want to generate more commercialisation from this knowledge
investment. Entrepreneurship serves as a conduit, the mechanism by which
those investments in knowledge translate into the market place to create
innovations, jobs and competitiveness. So in that sense, entrepreneurship I
think would be seen more as, creative construction rather than creative
destruction, given those investments that have been made. I think that this is
why we are seeing such a move towards an entrepreneurial economy and the
European entrepreneurial policy response.
VII  EUROPEAN ENTREPRENEURIAL POLICY RESPONSE 
My view is that Europe has gone through a process of shifting away from
the old economy or the capital-based economy characterised by the post-World
War II public policy debate, towards this very different economy, what I call an
entrepreneurial economy. In the entrepreneurial economy, entrepreneurship
provides a driving force of economic growth. By the way, I am not saying that
it is only entrepreneurship that counts. For example people can ask well, if
entrepreneurship is so important what about Kenya? Kenya is nothing but
micro-enterprises. Clearly physical capital is still very important. Places that
do well in the European and, North American contexts have something extra
over capital – they have entrepreneurship. So I would not want to say that
supporting the entrepreneurial economy means throwing out or burning down
the factories and closing up the universities – in fact it is the opposite. It is the
combination of capital and entrepreneurship that generates employment but
in a more complex manner than in the past. 
With respect to the entrepreneurial economy model I think that policy in
Europe and in North America has gone through five stages: denial,
recognition, envy, consensus and attainment.
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in Europe that when people and policymakers thought about what generated
success, generated growth and employment productivity, they thought about
manufacturing. Certainly, that was the inheritance from a famous book
written by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber back in the 1960s, The American
Challenge. What was that challenge? It was to create companies like General
Motors, US Steel – the great manufacturing companies. So there was a denial
about entrepreneurship and they looked to places like Silicon Valley where
there were lots of start-ups and so on. They also had many firms going out of
business, they were involved in a kind of industry or economic restructuring.
The second phase, recognition, probably started after the Berlin Wall fell
in the early 1990s. There was also recognition of the law of comparative
advantage. So while the entrepreneurial model began to be recognised, the law
of comparative advantage was invoked which was interpreted in this context
to say that Silicon Valley can produce software and microprocessors, Europe
can produce machine tools, autos and so on. And they can trade, so there was
a sense that the entrepreneurial development was valuable but not
necessarily for Europe. There was a sense too of the European small and
medium-sized enterprises, what we call the Mittelstand, being very different
from this entrepreneurship model. In this Mittelstand, there are companies in
traditional sectors, such as machine tools and metal working. In the
entrepreneurship model, the companies are in new sectors. Why is that?
Because they are based on ideas that other people typically rejected as not
being valuable. The Mittelstand tradition is low R&D, while the
entrepreneurial models focus on typically high R&D entrepreneurs based on
high human capital, higher wages. 
This entrepreneurial economy generates a lot of turbulence, with many
companies being started, and a lot of companies going out of business. In the
Mittelstand and certainly in Germany, but I think elsewhere in Europe, there
is much more stability, lower start-up rates, lower failure rates, with finance
tending to come from traditional sources – banks, finance institutions, etc.
Where we have an entrepreneurial model at work we see new sources of
finance in the sense that it is non-bank finance, often from angel capital.
People talk about venture capital but that is actually just miniscule, it
accounts for just a miniscule amount of the finances. This results in high-
growth companies in the entrepreneurial model and low-growth companies in
the Mittelstand, and so there is a recognition that there was difference. In the
middle of the 1990s the continent of Europe really went through stagnation –
low growth, and more unemployment, and it was clear that globalisation was
hitting Europe. There was a sense that the social contract that you have in
countries like Germany, France and Sweden was not sufficient to maintain
employment in those countries. 
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ten or twelve times that these places would copy, just copy each other and if
Bill Gates was in Germany there would be no Microsoft. It seemed to imply
that you could not have somebody like Bill Gates growing up in Germany as
the education system, the culture, and certainly a lot of the laws and a lot of
the policies would have made it difficult for him. It would have been difficult
to attract employees to a company that was starting up, because people want
long-term employment contracts and so on. It would have been difficult for
him to get finance to start up and so on. So there was a sense of
incompatibility of European institutions with this kind of entrepreneurial
model, even though there was an increasing recognition that entrepreneurship
can induce growth. 
But this gave rise to a fourth phase, consensus, which occurred around the
Lisbon European Council and the Lisbon mandate. It was not limited to
Lisbon, and for example, it was even more prevalent in the Gothenburg
European Council. I think also that individual European countries have
embraced entrepreneurship as well, triggered in part by policymakers visiting
the US and not just Silicon Valley. They saw this entrepreneurial driven
economy in places like Austin, Texas; Raleigh, North Carolina; Madison,
Wisconsin. I think they had a sense that if they can do it in North Carolina,
then we can surely do it in Munich or Stockholm. And there was a sense that
institutions can change and that is what led to this idea, of seeking to get
German research back into the top tier of world research. Of course, that was
before the current economic crisis, but I think it is a long-term change. There
is now a core commitment – in Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, most of
northern Europe – to becoming a knowledge and entrepreneurial driven
economy. That is seen as the way to grow and perform and succeed in terms of
global competitiveness, and this brings us to the final stage, attainment. 
VIII CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Let me close by suggesting that we have seen a shift in public policy away
from a focus on generating investments in physical capital. With that, the
focus was on how do you live with the beast of big business? To drive efficiency,
you need economies of scale, but this raises the challenge when firms are not
trusted to grow unabated. So there are lots of regulations, public ownership,
and competition policies to constrain behaviour. In the entrepreneurial
economy, it is a much more enabling policy that is at work. How do you enable
individuals to access ideas and then act on those ideas? Of course one
difference, when we talk about large incumbent corporations, is whether we
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policy in the economy driven by physical capital had a national focus. Public
ownership regulations, tended to be national policies. In the entrepreneurship
economy framework, because the knowledge tends to be local – university, a
company or cluster of companies associated with a place – the policies and the
benefits tend to be decentralised as well. This is perhaps one of the things that
people have been slower to pick up on, where we see deregulation, and
privatisation, we see less competition policy over time. I think what we have
not been able to see as much of because it is harder to measure, is the
emergence of lots and lots of innovation and entrepreneurship policies in the
city and at local level. 
Let me finish with a quote from Goethe which suggests that maybe this is
not so new. He wrote a couple of hundred years ago – …it is not enough to
know, you also have to do it, it’s not enough to want, you have to implement it.
It would suggest that it is not enough to have the knowledge but you have to
implement it. 
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